Gwaltney of Smithfield Revisited by Powers, Ann
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1-1-1999
Gwaltney of Smithfield Revisited
Ann Powers
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, apowers@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Water
Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ann Powers, Gwaltney of Smithfield Revisited, 23 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 557 (1999), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/
lawfaculty/200/.
When the United States Department of Justice filed a Clean Water 
Act' enforcement action in December 1996 against Smithfield Foods and 
its two subsidiaries, Smithfield Packing and Gwaltney of Smithfield,2 it 
was only the latest installment in an ongoing saga of the companies' 
disregard of environmental obligations, the state's abdication of its role as 
guardian of Virginia's natural resources, and efforts by citizens and the 
federal government to enforce the law. While those elements alone would 
provide sufficient local drama, the conflict has had an impact far beyond 
the borders of Virginia. It evolved from a fight to protect the Chesapeake 
Bay and its tributaries to a continuing national debate regarding the legal 
rights of citizens to assist in enforcing a broad range of federal 
environmental laws. 
The key player in that evolution has been the Supreme Court, 
which ruled in an earlier case involving Smithfield, Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation, Inc. & Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gwaltney 
of SmithJield, Ltd. (Gwaltney); that the Clean Water Act provided no 
jurisdiction for citizens to seek penalties for past violations and, therefore 
a citizen's right to enforce the statute was considerably more limited than 
that of the federal government? That decision, due both to what the Court 
said and what it left unsaid, has created substantial impediments for 
Associate Professor of Law, Center for Environmental Studies, Pace University School 
of Law. The author was Vice President and General Counsel of the Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation when G\valtney of Sinitltfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Fozazdation, Inc. & 
Natural Resozn.ces Defense Conizcil. Iitc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987), was litigated at the various 
judicial levels. The author wishes to thank those who gave her comments and 
suggestions, including James Hecker, Donald Doernberg, Stuart Madden, and Jay 
Carlisle. 
' 33 U.S.C. $$ 1251-1387 (1994). 
' United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., Smithfield Packing Company, Inc., & Gwaltney 
of Smithfield, Ltd., 965 F. Supp. 769 (summary judgment), 969 F. Supp. 975 (motion for 
reconsideration denied) (E.D. Va. 1997), appeal docketed, No. 97-2709 (4th Cir. Dec. 9, 
1997). The govemment prosecution will be referred to as United States v. S~nithfiekd. 
' 484 U.S. 49 (1987). 
'' See id. at 58-59. 
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citizens attempting to protect their local water bod ie~ .~  Their ability to 
enforce the Clean Water Act, as well as other environmental statutes, 
contrasts sharply with the government's broad enforcement power, 
reflected in cases such as United States v. Smithfield. 
Moreover, Gwaltney gave an early indication of the restrictions 
which would later be placed on citizen standing in environmental cases. 
While standing was not a prominent issue in Gwaltney, Justice Scalia's 
concurring opinion presages a fuller explication in later cases of his 
Article 111: and eventually Article 11,7 based formulations which generally 
restrict standing for environmentalists in citizen suit cases.8 The most 
recent iteration of those concepts appeared in last term's opinion in Steel 
Company v. Citizens for a Better En~ironment,~ where the Court ruled, 
See Beverly McQueary Smith, The Viability of Citizens ' Suits Under the Clean Water 
Act Afer  Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 40 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 1,62 (1990) [hereinafter Smith, The Viability of Citizens' Suits]. 
6 U.S. CONST., art. 111. Article I11 limits the judicial power vested in federal courts to 
"Cases" and "Controversies." The requirement that there be a justiciable case or 
controversy is the basis for the standing doctrine. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Karin P. Sheldon, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: The 
Supreme Court's Slash and Burn Approach to Environmental Standing, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,031, 10,032, 10,036-37 (1993). See also Lujan v. National Wildlife 
Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, rejected the 
citizens' standing claims, but on statutory, rather than constitutional grounds); Karin 
Sheldon, NWF v. Lujan: Justice Scalia Restricts Environmental Standing to Constrain 
the Courts, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,557, 10,558 (1990). 
U.S. CONST., art. 11. Article I1 vests the executive, legislative and judicial functions in 
the three separate branches of government. Section 3 of the Article contains the so-called 
"Take Care Clause" which directs that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed." In Lujan v. Defenders of Wililife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992), the 
Court relied upon this Clause to limit the ability of Congress to define injuries so as to 
provide a generalized right of standing. See Standing-Congressional Power to Define 
Jcldicially Cognizable Injuries, 106 HARV. L. REV. 308 (1 992). 
8 By contrast, in Bennett 1). Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997), the Court liberalized the 
standing requirements somewhat by ruling that the "zone-of-interests test" established in 
Associatioit of Dntn Processing Service Organizations. Inc. 1. Cnntp, 397 U.S. 1 50 
(1970), was prudential, and not a requirement of Article 111. Thus Congress might negate 
the judge-made rule through specific legislative language. The Court found that the 
citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. $ 1540(g)(l) (19941, 
which allows "any person" to commence an action, had expanded standing under the Act 
to the full extent permitted under Article 111. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1163. See also 
Bernard Schwartz, A Presidential Strikeout. Federalism, RFRA, Standing, and Stealth 
Cocn?, 33 TULSA L.J. 77, 84-87 (1997). The practical effect of this holding was to extend 
standing to the regulated community to challenge environmental actions. 
" 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998). 
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Justice Scalia writing, that citizens have no standing to seek penalties 
under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA)'O for reporting violations that had been cured by the defendant 
corporation." That decision, and the lower court cases following it, reflect 
an increasingly restrictive judicial approach to citizen litigation that may 
lead to an ever greater divergence between government and citizen 
enforcement authority, which Congress originally intended to be 
coextensive. 
This article returns to the earlier Gwaltney decision, looking both 
to the text of the Gwaltney opinion, and to internal memoranda 
demonstrating the debate which occurred among the justices themselves 
over the nature of the beast with which they were dealing: a confusing 
mixture of subject matter jurisdiction, substantive cause of action and 
constitutionally based standing requirements. This review leads to the 
conclusion that the opinion's lack of analytical clarity, which created 
substantial confusion for courts and litigants, could have been avoided by 
a more carefully reasoned work based on the Court's internal discussions. 
Further, the Court's decision in Steel Company demonstrates a debate 
within the Court regarding the import of Gwaltney, raising questions as to 
its future application, as well as the eventual fate of citizen suits under 
federal environmental statutes. 
While not the oldest, Clean Water Act (CWA) section 50512 is the 
most prominent and the most litigated of the citizen suit provisions found 
in our environmental statutes.I3 Enacted in 1972 and modeled after the 
Clean Air Act (CAA),14 it allows citizens to bring suits against the 
government for failure to carry out mandated duties,I5 and against entities, 
lo 42 U.S.C. $5  11001-11050 (1994). The citizen suit provision is found at 42 U.S.C. $ 
11046(a)(l). 
' I  See Steel Colttpmy, 118 S. Ct. at 1020. 
"Pub. L. 92-500, 5 505, 86 Stat. 888,33 U.S.C. $ 1365 (1994). 
l3  See LISA JORGENSON & JEFFREY J. KIMMEL, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, 
ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS: CONFRONTING THE CORPORATIONS 19 (1988) (of over 
1200 citizen actions reviewed, 882 were Clean Water Act claims); Randall S. Abate, 
Retkillkillg Citizen Suits for Past Violations of Federal Laws: Recomnte~ldations for the 
Next Decade of Applying the Gwaltizey Standard, 16 TEMP. ENVTL.  & TECH. J. 1 
(1997). 
I" Pub. L. 91- 604, $ 304,84 Stat. 1706, 42 U.S.C. $ 7604 (1994). 
'' See 33 U.S.C. $1365 (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
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both public and private, which violate provisions of the statute.I6 
Authorizations for a citizen to bring suit are not unique to environmental 
law,I7 and find their heritage in both American and English law of previous 
centuries.I8 In enacting section 505, Congress understood that the 
resources of the government were limited, and that citizens could therefore 
supplement the government in its enforcement  endeavor^.'^ It also 
recognized that the government might not always have the will to 
prosecute a violator, and citizen suits were useful to goad the executive 
branch to action.20 In examining the relevant legislative history, there is 
scant support for the notion that Congress intended citizens to be more 
constrained in the scope of their prosecutions than the go~ernrnent.~' 
However, two limitations protecting the primacy of governmental 
enforcement were placed on a citizen's initiation of a lawsuit. First, a 
potential litigant must give notice to the government and to the 
constitution). 
l6 See id. (authorizing a citizen to initiate an action against "any person" alleged to be in 
violation of federal or state limitations). A "person" under section 1362 is defined as "an 
individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or 
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 
l7 A number of statutes other that those dealing with environmental law contain 
provisions which allow citizens to bring private actions to enforce the law or to recover 
for injuries. See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. $ 15 (1994); Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U.S.C. $ 77k (a) (1994); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. $ 2073 (1994); Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. $5  2000a-3(a), 2000e-5(b) (1994). 
l8 See Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A 
Prelimina~y Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. 
REV. 833, 946-57 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen 
Suits. "Injuries, I' and Article III,91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 17 1-79 (1 992); Steven L. Winter, 
Tlze Metaplzor of Standing and tlze Probleaz of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 
1394-1409 (1988). See also James M. Hecker, Tlze Citizen's Role in Environ~ne~ztal 
Ellforcement: Private Attorney Ge~zeral. Private Citizen. or Botl~?, 8-SPG NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV'T 31 (1994) (characterizing citizen suits as a blend of private and 
public rights). 
l9  See S. REP. NO. 414, at 5 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,3672. 
'O See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 
560 (1986) (Court noted that congressional displeasure with "restrained" governmental 
enforcement of Clean Air Act led to first citizen-suit provision); S. REP. NO. 414, supra 
note 19, at 5. 
" Not only the similarity of language between the government and citizen enforcement 
provision, but also the legislative history suggests that Congress viewed citizens as 
private attorneys general, who were "provided the right to seek vigorous enforcement 
action under the citizen suit provisions of section 505." S. REP. NO. 414, at 64 (1972), 
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,3730. 
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prospective defendant of his intent to sue.22 The second limitation 
generally prohibits suit if the federal or state government is already 
pursuing enforcement actions.23 If, however, a citizen files his suit first, 
the court generally will not be ousted of jurisdiction by a subsequent 
government These preconditions having been met, the statute vests 
jurisdiction in the district court to enforce certain provisions of the law,2s 
and to apply civil penalties as spelled out in section 309,26 the general 
enforcement provisions applicable to both government and citizen 
prosecutors. 
Within this framework a number of citizen suits were brought in 
the 1970s. Most were filed against federal agencies to compel them to 
carry out various mandatory duties, such as issuing  standard^.'^ It was not 
22 See CWA $ 505(b)(l)(A), 33 U.S.C. $ 1365(b)(l)(A) (1994). Although the Court in 
Gwaltney declared that the intent of this provision was to give the violator an opportunity 
to come into compliance, see 484 U.S. at 60, this view is simply unsupported by the 
legislative history. Rather, the provision was to allow the government time to determine 
whether to bring its own prosecution before allowing the citizen suit to proceed. See S. 
REP. NO. 414, at 80 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745-46; JEFFREY G. 
MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL 
LAWS $ 6.1, 44-45 (1987) [hereinafter MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS]; Scott B. Garrison, 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Standing, and Citizen Suits: The Effect of Gwaltney of 
Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation. Inc., 48 MD. L. REV. 403,419 & 11-92 (1989); 
Jeffrey M. Miller, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.: 
Invitation to the Dance of Litigation, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,098, 10,101- 
02 (1988) [hereinafter Miller, Invitation]. Professor Miller also points out that the literal 
language of the notice provision implies that suits for past violations were contemplated. 
See id. Despite of the lack of support for Marshall's interpretation, it has become gospel, 
and was most recently repeated by Justice Stevens in Steel Co. vs. Citizens for a Better 
Environment, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1031 (1998). 
"See  CWA 5 505(b)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(B). 
'"t is possible that a subsequently filed government lawsuit which is resolved prior to 
the citizen suit may be determined to be res jndicntn, barring further litigation by the 
citizen plaintiff. See, e.g., EPA v. City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d 1394, 1404 (8th Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 956 (1991). In any suit brought by a citizen, the 
govemment may intervene as a matter of right. See CWA 5 505(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. 5 
1365(c)(2). 
" Citizens may bring suit against "any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of (A) 
an effluent standard or limitation . . . or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a 
State with respect to such a standard or limitation." CWA $ 505(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. 3 
1365(a)(1). 
' 6  33 U.S.C. 5 13 19(d). 
" See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 
1976) (action seeking to force the Environmental Protection Agency to list lead as 
hazardous air pollutant pursuant to Clean Air Act 5 108); Natural Resources Defense 
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until the early 1980s that citizens, impelled by discontent with 
implementation and enforcement of environmental laws during the 
administration of President Ronald Reagan, began to focus on litigation 
directly against polluters.28 The Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC), a national public interest environmental organization, established 
a Clean Water Act Enforcement Project aimed at identieing significant 
violators which had not been brought to task by the government, and filing 
suits to force compliance. NRDC joined forces with local and regional 
environmental groups in this effort, including the Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation (CBF), an organization focused on protecting and restoring the 
Chesapeake Bay.2g The two groups reviewed state and federal records, and 
pinpointed Gwaltney and its sister company, Smithfield Packing, as two of 
the most egregious violators in the region.30 After giving the requisite 
notice, CBF and NRDC filed suit against Gwaltney in federal district 
The state of Virginia subsequently brought an action in state court 
against Gwaltney, which it dismissed after trial of the federal action.32 
Council, Inc. v. Train, 519 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1975), on remand, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,588 (D.D.C. 1976) (suit to force the Environmental Protection 
Agency to promulgate effluent standards for toxics under Clean Water Act !j 307); Boyer 
& Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Ellforcement, supra note 18, at 852-53. 
l8 See JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS, supra note 22, 9 2.3; Boyer & Meidinger, 
Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement, supra note 18, at 845-46, 852-53. See also S. REP. 
NO. 414, at 5 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3672 (noting almost total 
lack of government enforcement under Clean Water Act); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAORCED-84-53, WASTEWATER DISCHARGERS ARE NOT COMPLYING WITH 
EPA POLLUTION CONTROL PERMITS (1983) (reporting a significant decline in federal 
enforcement). 
'9 See JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS, supra note 22, !j 2.3, 11 (1987); Smith, The 
Viability of Citizerls' Suits, supra note 5, at 43-44. See also Theodore L. Garrett, Citizen 
Suits After Gwaltney, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, ENVIRONMENTAL L W, C266 ALI- 
ABA 305,308-09 (1988). 
30 TWO other major violators identified by the groups were American Recovery and 
Bethlehem Steel, both in Baltimore, Maryland. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. & 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. American Recovery Co.. 769 F.2d 207 (4th 
Cir. 1985); Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. & Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md. 1987). 
" Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 61 1 F.Supp. 1542, 1544 (E.D. 
Va. 1985) [hereinafter G\t~altt~ey 4.
'' Commonwealth v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., No. 3371 (Cir. Ct. Isle of Wight Co. 
filed July 10, 1984) (order of nonsuit Aug. 28, 1985). The Commonwealth had 
previously filed a separate suit against Smithfield Packing Company, another subsidiary 
of Smithfield Foods, which operated a facility near Gwaltney, alleging 152 violations of 
its wastewater discharge permit. See Commonwealth v. Smithfield Packing Co., Inc, No. 
Heinonline - -  23 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 562 1998-1999 
Gwaltney and Smithfield Packing are the subject of the government's 
subsequent enforcement action. 
Gwaltney of Smithfield was, and is, a major meatpacking 
operation, slaughtering thousands of hogs a day.33 Its wastes are organic, 
largely offal from the slaughtering  operation^.'^ These wastes were treated 
in a standard biological process, similar to that used by sewage treatment 
plants, and discharged to the Pagan River, a tributary to the Chesapeake 
Bay.3S The discharge was covered by a permit issued by the state of 
Virginia under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System.36 
Although a number of pollutants were controlled under the permit, the two 
of primary interest were chlorine, a toxic used to disinfect wastes, and 
nitrogen, a pollutant which contributes to algal growth and low levels of 
dissolved oxygen, or hypoxia, in the Bay and its tr ib~taries.~~ Plaintiffs 
moved for summary judgment based on permit violations contained in 
reports filed with the go~emment:~ and District Judge Robert R. Merhige, 
3290 (Cir. Ct. Isle of Wight Co. filed Oct. 24, 1983). The Chesapeake Bay Foundation 
intervened in that suit. The court found Smithfield Packing liable and imposed a penalty 
of $40,000. Opinion (Dec. 14, 1984). 
33 See WELLS ENGINEERS ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., STUDY AND REPORT: PHOSPHORUS 
REMOVAL; SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC.; SMITHFIELD, VIRGINIA, 1 (1990). 
34 See id. at 2.  
35 The violations which CBF and NRDC challenged were essentially similar to those in 
the current government prosecution. See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. 
Supp. 769,774 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
36 See CWA 3 402,33 U.S.C. 3 1342 (1994). 
37 When algae die the decomposition process uses oxygen, lowering the level of 
dissolved oxygen in the water column. Adequate levels of dissolved oxygen are essential 
for aquatic life such as fish and shellfish. Hypoxia can be especially damaging for 
organisms, such as oysters, which cannot move to more oxygen-enriched waters. 
Hypoxia can also alter the ecological makeup of a water body, wiping out organisms 
sensitive to low oxygen levels, while allowing those types of organisms which can 
sustain themselves in such conditions to survive. See LONG ISLAND SOUND STUDY, 
HYPOXIA AND NUTRIENT ENRICHMENT-ASSESSMENT OF CONDITIONS AND 
MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (1993). In addition, algae cloud the water, 
depriving submerged aquatic vegetation important to many species for food and habitat 
of the light necessary for growth. See Alliance for the Chesapeake, New Air Rules 
Expected to Help Reduce Bay Nufrie~zts, BAY JOURNAL, July-Aug., 1997, at 10. 
38 Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs) detailing the level of compliance achieved for 
the effluents regulated by the permit must be filed at prescribed intervals and are key to 
facility of oversight and enforcement. See 40 C.F.R. 3 122.41(1)(4) (1998). 
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Jr., granted the motion, finding Gwaltney liable for over 600 days of 
violation of the chlorine and nitrogen limitations in its permit.39 After a 
trial on the remedy, the court imposed a penalty of $1.28 million;40 almost 
$1 million was based on the chlorine violations, and the balance was a 
result of the nitrogen  discharge^.^' The court rejected a post-trial challenge 
to its subject matter jurisdiction in which the defendant argued that the 
language of section 505 permitted suits only when the discharger was 
violating the Act at the time the complaint was filed." Defendant's 
argument was based on a Fifth Circuit decision issued after the Gwaltney 
trial was concluded, Hamker v. Dianzond Shamrock Chenzical CO.,~' in 
which a court had for the first time ruled in such a fashion. It was 
generally viewed by public interest environmental attorneys as an 
aberration, flying in the face of the obvious intent of Congress to allow 
citizens to step into the shoes of the government when bringing suits under 
section 505 and similar  provision^.^^ Judge Merhige concurred in this 
assessment and ruled against  defendant^.^^ On appeal, the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the ruling,"6 creating a conflict with the Fifth Circuit and setting 
the stage for the company's petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme 
Court. 
Upon initial consideration of the petition only three of the Justices 
voted to hear the case." But subsequently the First Circuit reached a 
conclusion different from both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits on the 
jurisdictional issue in an action under Clean Water Act section 505. In 
Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,4= the First Circuit held 
39 See Gwaltney 1,611 F.Supp. 1542, 1555 (E.D. Va. 1985). 
"O See id. at 1564. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 
F.2d 304, 307-08 (4th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Gwalt~ley I/]. This was the largest penalty 
ever imposed to date in a citizen suit; it exceeded most penalties obtained by the 
government. See Smith, Tlze Viability of Citizens ' Suits, szrp~.a note 5, at 44. 
"' See Gwalt~zey 1, 61 1 F. Supp. at 1562, 1565. 
" See id. at 1544. 
" 9 5 6  F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985). 
"" At that time the enforcement powers of citizens were generally viewed as co-extensive 
with those of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. See G~valttzey 11, 791 F.2d at 
3 10, and cases cited therein. 
"See Gwaltney 1, 611 F. Supp. at 1548. 
" See Gwaltney 11, 791 F.2d at 3 10-1 1. 
.'7 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., No. 86-473, Bench 
Memorandum, Oct. 5, 1987 (Aug. 27, 1987), Thurgood Marshall Papers (on file with the 
Manuscript Division, U.S. Library of Congress) [hereinafter Marshall Papers], box 427, 
folder 8. 
48 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986). 
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that citizens could not bring suit for violations that were totally past, but a 
plaintiff who in good faith made allegations of an ongoing violation could 
enforce penalties for past violations even if no ongoing violations were 
proven.49 Based on this decision, Justice White drafted a dissent to the 
denial of the certiorari petition50 that induced Justice Powell to change his 
negative vote, making the fourth requisite vote to grant the peti t i~n.~'  
Thus, when the case was presented to the Supreme Court, three 
Circuits had rendered three different opinions on whether section 505 
conferred jurisdiction on the courts to impose penalties in a suit brought 
by citizens when the violations had ceased before the complaint was filed. 
The Fifth Circuit in Hamker had ruled that there was no jurisdiction to 
enforce the penalty provisions in such a circ~mstance.~~ The Fourth 
Circuit decided in Gwaltney that citizens could bring such a while 
the First Circuit had ruled that citizens could enforce penalties for past 
violations so long as they had in good faith alleged an ongoing violation.54 
All those involved in citizen suit litigation-public interest, industry and 
the government attorneys-focused their attention on the Supreme Court's 
consideration of Gwaltney. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
A. Divining Congressional Intent 
The Gwaltney decision, written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, well 
reflects the problems which plague litigants and the courts when Congress 
40 See Pawtuxet Cove Mariiza, Inc., 807 F.2d at 1094. 
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., No. 86-473, Second 
Draft of Dissent from Denial of Certiorari by Justice Byron White (Jan. 8, 1987), 
Marshall Papers, sripln note 47, box 440, folder 4. Justice White had drafted an earlier 
dissent from the denial, but reissued it adding the Palvtrixet Cove case. See First Draft of 
Dissent from Denial of Certiorari by Justice Byron White (Dec. 22, 1986), Marshall 
Papers, supra note 47, box 440, folder 4. 
" See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., No. 86-473, Bench 
Memorandum, Oct. 5, 1987, at 1 (Aug. 27, 1987), Marshall Papers, sripra note 47, box 
427, folder 8. Voting for certiorari were Justices White, Stevens, Scalia and Powell. See 
id. 
'= See Harnker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 756 F.2d 392,394 (5th Cir. 1985). 
" See G\valtney 11,791 F.2d 304,308-09 (4th Cir. 1986). 
" See Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 
1986). 
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566 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. [Vol. 23557 
writes laws with less than "syntactical precisi~n."~~ Laboring under the 
assumption that Congress knew what it was doing, an effort must be made 
to divine exactly what that body intended. 
The statutory language central to the Gwaltney debate is found in 
section 505(a)(l) which specifies that "any citizen may commence a civil 
action . . . (1) against any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of '  
certain requirements of the law.56 Jurisdiction is vested in the district 
courts to enforce the provisions of the statute and to apply "any 
appropriate civil penalties" under section 309(d), the general penalty 
provisions of the Clean Water Act, which is applicable to both citizen and 
government enfor~ement.~' The "alleged to be in violation" formulation is 
somewhat unusual as most statutes impose sanctions on those who 
"violate," "are violating," " have violated" or are simply "in violation" of 
the law. Much turned on the "alleged to be in violation" phrase, and 
reading the briefs, the decision and subsequent analyses brings to mind 
Humpty Dumpty's admonition to Alice, "When I use a word . . . it means 
just what I choose it to mean . . . neither more nor less."58 
Just what Congress chose these words to mean is not found in the 
legislative history of the Clean Water Act, but the language obviously was 
" Brief for the Respondents at 22, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay 
Found, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987). 
s6 CWA 5 505(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a) (1994) provides: 
Citizen suits. 
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and section 
13 19(g)(6) of this title, any citizen may commence a civil action on his 
own behalf- 
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any 
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted 
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in 
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or 
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such 
a standard or limitation, or 
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is 
not discretionary with the Administrator. 
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount 
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an 
effluent standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the 
Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to 
apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title. 
" See id. 
-'' LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH T E LOOKING-GLASS 198 (Messner ed. 1982). 
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copied from the original citizen suit language in the Clean Air Act.59 
Although the Clean Air Act legislative history is less than enlightening on 
this point, the "alleged to be in violation" language made sense in that 
context because, until amended in 1990, the Clean Air Act allowed citizen 
suits only to abate an ongoing violation and not to enforce penalty 
 provision^.^^ Accordingly, the language of the statute was drafted to 
address a situation in which the violation was ongoing, and not one in 
which past violations were a factor. The Clean Air Act language provided 
an easy model for the drafters of the Clean Water Act, who simply adopted 
it without m~dification.~' Indeed, there is no reason to believe that 
Congress thought about this particular issue at all. It seems a classic case 
of Congress drafting a law which appears to be straightfonvard-allowing 
citizens to sue to enforce the law-but which has enough ambiguity to 
permit creative lawyers to read into it meaning that favors their clients. 
And unfortunately for citizens, that ambiguity was enough to create an 
issue for certiorari. 
Petitioner Gwaltney framed its challenge in terns of subject matter 
jurisdiction, arguing that Congress intended the courts to be able to hear 
only those cases in which the defendant was "in violation" at the time the 
complaint was filed,"* and that a citizen's cause of action should be limited 
to abating the violations and enforcing penalties for violations that 
occurred at the time the complaint was filed or thereafter.63 CBF and 
59 CWA $ 304(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. 5 7604(a)(l) (1994). See Miller, Invitation, supra note 
22, at 10,100. 
60 See 42 U.S.C. 5 7604 (1994). 
6' See Miller, Invitation, supra note 22, at 10,100. 
6%waltney challenged plaintiffs' standing in district court in its answer to the complaint 
and moved to dismiss. Answer at 2-4. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the 
liability issue, and Judge Merhige granted summary judgment for plaintiffs on liability. 
See Charles N. Nauen, Citizen Eirvironnrental Lalvsltits After Gwaltney: Tlje Tlrrill of 
Victoiy or the Agony of Defeat? 15 W M .  MITCHELL . REV. 327, 342 (1989) (citing 
Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 108 S.Ct 376, 380 (1987)). 
Subsequently Gwaltney sought to force plaintiffs to present proof of standing at trial, 
without success. See G~valt~tey I, 61 1 F. Supp. 1542, 1545-47 & n.5 (E.D. Va. 1985). 
Gwaltney did not appeal on the standing issue, See G~valtney 11, 791 F.2d 304, 306 n.1 
(4th Cir. 1985), or directly challenge standing in the Supreme Court. See G~valtrley, 484 
U.S. 49, 70 (1987). The company did raise standing in its reply brief, but only as it 
related to redressability. See Reply brief for Petitioner 17-18, Gwaltney of Smithfield, 
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987). 
63 See Lance L. Shea, Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation: Balancing 
Iirterests Under tlre Cleair Water Act, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857, 859 (1988) (citing 
G~vnltney I, 61 1 F. Supp. at 1544). 
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NRDC rejoined that a citizen's right to sue was coextensive with that of 
the government, which is to say that a citizen might seek abatement as 
- well as penalties for both ongoing and past violations. 
B. The Government's Position 
An additional participant in the debate was the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) whose staff was generally sympathetic to citizen 
enforcement efforts and had a strong interest in judicial construction of the 
citizen suit provisions.@ The Department of Justice filed an amicus brief 
in the Fourth Circuit on behalf of CBF and NRDC, who ceded argument 
time to the g~vernment .~~ When the case reached the Supreme Court, the 
Solicitor General filed a brief on behalf of the United States supporting 
affirmance of the appellate ruling.66 But the position the Solicitor argued 
was not the same as plaintiffs', and aligned more closely with the First 
Circuit in Pawtuxet Cove Marina67 that a good faith allegation of present 
noncompliance was the standard established by section 505.68 The 
government's position was arrived at only after extensive discussion 
between representatives of EPA and the Department of Justice, as well as 
lawyers for plaintiffs and defendant, as both sides sought Justice 
Department support for their positions.69 Although some officials within 
the Justice Department were strongly disposed toward Gwaltney's 
position, there was concern by others that a ruling limiting citizens to 
penalties for past violations could lead to a similar limitation in 
government enforcement cases." Because the "in violation" language is 
also found in section 309, the general enforcement provisions apply to 
both the government and  citizen^.^' Thus the Solicitor chose a middle 
@ See, e.g.. Smith, The Viability of Citizens 'Sziits, sripra note 5, at 19. 
" See Letter from John M. Greacen, Clerk of the Court, Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. 
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 307-08 (4th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1873), Jan. 
21, 1986. 
66 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 14-22, 
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987). 
67 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir.1986). 
bs See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 14-22, 
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987). 
69 The author was a participant in these discussions. 
70 Id. 
7' See, e.g., CWA 8 309(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. 8 1319(a)(l) (1994) (the Administrator is 
authorized to take enforcement actions whenever he "finds that any person is in violatiotl 
of any condition or limitation") (emphasis added); 8 309(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. fj 1319(a)(3) 
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ground which supported  plaintiff^,'^ but differentiated the scope of subject 
matter jurisdiction conferred upon citizens from that of the g~vernment .~~ 
The decision issued by the Court rejected the positions of both the 
citizen groups and the company, and essentially adopted the middle 
ground staked out by the First Circuit in Pawtuxet Cove and the 
g~vernrnent.~~ Unfortunately, it did not do so in the same straightforward 
manner found in the appellate court decisions in Gwaltney and Pawtuxet 
Cove and in the brief filed by the Solicitor General. Admittedly, the 
Court's analysis of section 505 was complicated by the unusual 
confluence of subject matter jurisdiction, cause of action and standing, 
which presented analytical problems, as reflected both in the opinion and 
the internal memoranda circulated among the justices. But the opinion 
ultimately did not present a clear and cogent analysis of the issues. 
C. The Majority Opinion 
The majority opinion, drafted by Justice Marshall, ignored the 
textual similarity of the government and citizen suit provisions and the 
(the Administrator may issue a compliance order when he "finds that any person is ill 
violation" of provisions of the statute) (emphasis added); CWA 5 309(c), 33 U.S.C. 5 
1319(c) (criminal penalties may be imposed against "[alny person who willfully or 
negligently violates" provisions of the statute or permit conditions or limitations) 
(emphasis added); CWA 309(c), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(d) (civil penalties may be imposed 
against "[alny person who violates" provisions of the statute or permit limitations or 
conditions) (emphasis added). Thus, if a citizen were prohibited from taking any 
enforcement action against polluters whose violations ceased prior to the filing of suit, 
the same prohibition should logically apply to government enforcement. 
7' Plaintiffslrespondents again ceded time to the government for oral argument, but were 
pointed in remarking on the Solicitor's position: "Although grateful for this support, so 
far as it goes, we surmise that conflicting interests within the Government have, once 
again, led to an unrealistic search for a 'middle ground."' Brief for the Respondents at 
26 11-19, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 
(1987). 
73 In G~tlalt~rey, no mention is made of Clrevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resorirces Defense 
Colnrcil, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishing the standard by which a court reviews an 
agency's interpretation of a statute which it administers). This is most likely because the 
statutory provision at issue was not addressed administratively by the agency, but only in 
its amicus brief. It is doubtful whether a position developed as a litigation strategy 
should be afforded the same deference as one that has survived the administrative 
process. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988). 
Moreover, CWA 5 505 deals with jurisdiction, a matter more suited to judicial rather 
than executive interpretation. 
74 See Cwalttrey, 484 U.S. 49 (1987). 
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legislative hist~ry.'~ It severely undercut citizen enforcement rights under 
the Clean Water Act, circumscribing the situations in which citizens might 
enforce the Act's penalty provi~ions.~~ Moreover, the decision caused 
substantial confusion as to exactly what was required of litigants, that 
might have been avoided by clearer drafting. 
In Justice Marshall's view, Congress intended a good-faith 
allegation of an on-going violation to suffice for jurisdictional purposes.77 
Plaintiffs would be constrained by the requirement, set forth in Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of a good-faith belief well-grounded 
in fact in order to file the complaint.7g Once suit had commenced, a 
defendant might, under proper circumstances, avail itself of the mootness 
doctrine in order to have the suit dismissed.79 Marshall noted that Supreme 
75 The Court also misread the overall purpose of citizen suits, focusing on the argument 
that the provisions were aimed primarily at allowing citizens to abate violations, and not 
to step fully into the shoes of the government. The Court characterized the citizen's role 
at "supplemental" and "interstitial." See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60-61. 
76 See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 65. Neither the Fourth Circuit nor the Supreme Court 
questioned that the government could sue to collect penalties for past violations. See 
Gwaltney 11,791 F.2d at 309; Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58. Accordingly, EPA has generally 
not had to concern itself with whether violations it prosecuted were ongoing. See, e.g., 
United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 725 F. Supp.928, 931-32 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (rejecting 
defendant's argument that it must have been in violation of Act when suit was filed). 
However, in 3M v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1462 (D.C. Cir.1994), the court ruled that the 
statute of limitations begins to run at the time a violation occurs, not when it is 
discovered. But see United States v. Telluride Co., (10th Cir. 1998) (dealing with 
retroactive injunctions as remedial measures for wholly past violations). Thus it is in 
EPA's interest in some instances to argue that a violation is not a one time occurrence, 
but ongoing and recurrent. 
77 See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 65. 
See id. One commentator suggested that the Supreme Court's approach differed 
slightly from that of the First Circuit, which seemed to place more emphasis on 
defendant's likelihood of continuing its violative conduct than on plaintiffs good faith 
belief. See Scott B. Garrison, Szibject Matter Jlirisdiction. Standirzg, arzd Citizerr Suits: 
Tlze Eflect of Gwalmey of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 48 MD. L. 
REV. 403, 432 (1989). See also Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 
F.2d 1089, 1093-94 (1st Cir. 1986). 
79 See G~valt~zey, 484 U.S. at 66. Marshall's brief reference to mootness seemed intended 
to do no more than point out that traditional notions of mootness would apply in citizen 
suit cases, but its effect seemingly was to encourage defendants to raise mootness claims. 
That was certainly the effect in Gwalt~zey, where defendants raised the issue for the first 
time on remand. See Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwalmey of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 
690, 696 (4th Cir. 1989). The court refused to find the claim moot, and until recently 
most courts have similarly found those claims unavailing. However, the Fourth Circuit 
recently revised it position on the issue, ruling in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
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Court standing jurisprudence recognized that allegations of injury were 
sufficient to invoke a court's jurisdiction and rejected petitioner's 
contention "that failure to require proof of allegations under 5 505 would 
permit plaintiffs whose allegations of ongoing violation are reasonable but 
untrue to maintain suit in federal court even thought they lack 
constitutional S tan ding."^^ 
Having dealt with the jurisdictional language of the statute, Justice 
Marshall turned to the standing issue, describing the process by which a 
plaintiffs standing might be challenged." It is at this point that the 
analysis falters. That is not because the process for challenging standing 
described by Justice Marshall is in~orrec t .~~  But the context in which it is 
applied in Gwaltney, where the facts necessary to prove jurisdiction and 
the facts necessary to prove the claim [and perhaps standing] are identical, 
engendered a disappointing lack of clarity, and left substantial uncertainty 
as to the standards citizen litigants would need to meet. 
D. Justice Scalia 's Concurrence 
Justice Scalia's concurrence did not make matters more plain. He 
took Marshall to task for creating "a regime that is not only 
extraordinary," but to his knowledge "unique,"83 by creating subject matter 
jurisdiction based on a good faith a l legat i~n.~~ In Scalia's view, the 
jurisdictional issue was whether the petitioner was "in violation" at the 
time the complaint was filed.g5 But he recognized that the evidence 
necessary to prove that the petitioner was "in violation" was essentially the 
same evidence that would be needed to prove a good-faith allegation; that 
is, "whether petitioner had taken remedial steps that had clearly achieved 
Environmental Serv. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303,306 (4th Cir. 1998), that an action might 
become moot on appeal because the defendant had ceased its illegal conduct. See 
discussiom i1lfi.a note 183 and accompanying text. 
" Givaltt~ey, 484 U.S. at 65. 
" See id. at 65-66. 
'' A defendant may move for summary judgment on the standing issue, in which case 
plaintiff will have to show, generally by affidavits, that his allegations of standing are not 
a sham. If the motion fails, defendant may then put plaintiff to his proof at trial on the 
merits. Marshall emphasized that there was no constitutional requirement that, in order 
to invoke the district court's jurisdiction, a plaintiff offer this proof as a threshold matter. 
See id. at 66. 
g3 Id. at 68. 
" See id. 
'' See id. at 69. 
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the effect of curing all past violations by the time suit was b ro~gh t . "~~  
Indeed, he concedes that the two standards would produce substantially 
the same results.87 Unfortunately for the lucidity of the opinion, Scalia 
does no more than Marshall to acknowledge and analyze the difficulties 
inherent in a situation where the jurisdictional facts and the cause of action 
overlap. 
Justice Scalia raised the standing question, arguing that if the 
defendant was not in violation when the suit was initiated, then there 
would be no remediable injury.88 He emphasized that this was both a 
constitutional requirement and a specific requirement spelled out in the 
statute which defines a "citizen" who might bring suit." Scalia concluded 
that "we have interpreted the statute to confer subject-matter jurisdiction 
over a class of cases in which, by the terms of the statute itself, there 
cannot possibly be standing to sue."g0 Like Marshall, Scalia failed to 
address the almost complete overlap in the statute of jurisdiction, merits, 
and standing. But his standing argument is important because it reflects 
his concern with necessity for an injury that can be redressed by the court 
to support standing, which would eventuate in the Steel Company opinion. 
This lack of analytical clarity hampered litigants and the lower 
courts when parsing the decision for guidance. And at least some of that 
might have been avoided by a more careful crafting of the opinion. But a 
review of the colloquy among the judges while the opinion was being 
drafted reveals little attention to the matter." It is interesting, if not 
instructive, for the way in which the court chose to address or not address 
the issues. 
Roughly a month after the case was argued, Justice Marshall 
Id. at 69-70. 
87 See id. at 70. 
" See id. 
'' See id. at 70. To have citizen's standing, one must have "an interest which is or may 
be adversely affected." See also 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(g) (1994). 
q0 Gtz~altiley, 484 U.S. at 71. 
" One Supreme Court observer has suggested that the Justices are far less concerned than 
academics with the specific language of opinions, which may be the joint product of 
several Justices and their clerks. See Richard J. Lazarus, Coztntitzg Votes a11d 
Discountiilg Holdings lit The Supre~ize Court's Takings Cases, 38 W M .  & MARY L. REV. 
1099, 1 119 (1998) 
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circulated a draft opinion that, with minor changes, became the final 
opinion of the Court.g2 Both Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens voiced 
concerns about language in the draft that indicated that citizens "may seek 
civil penalties for past violations of the Act only in a suit brought to enjoin 
or otherwise abate an ongoing ~iolation."~' Scalia wrote to Marshall, "I 
thought we had agreed to leave for another day the question whether, if 
one continuing violation is established, penalties may be assessed with 
respect to other violations that are not ~ontinuing."~~ Stevens also wrote 
that it was not necessary to decide the point in the case before them.9s He 
further suggested that it was not necessary to decide whether the allegation 
of ongoing violation was sufficient to confer jurisdiction: "[Wlhy not 
simply remand to the district court with instructions to make appropriate 
findings concerning the adequacy of this proof and leave to another day 
the more esoteric question whether the allegation by itself is enough to 
support jurisdi~tion?"~~ Stevens continued: 
"[ilf the plaintiff is unable to support an allegation of 
continuous or intermittent violation by evidence that is 
persuasive to the trial judge, the plaintiffs claim should 
92 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., No. 86-473, First 
Draft of Opinion for the Court, slip op. (Nov. 5, 1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47, 
box 440, folder 4. 
93 Id. slip op. at 8. 
94 Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Nov. 9, 
1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47. Subsequent to Gwaltney this issue has been 
resolved in at least three different fashions by the lower courts. See, e.g., Chesapeake 
Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 690, 697-98 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(ongoing violation of one parameter of the permit does not confer jurisdiction at to other 
parameters); Friends of the Earth v. Chevron Chemical Co., 900 F.Supp. 67 (E.D. Tex. 
1995) (accord); Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Elf Atochem N. America, Inc., 
817 F. Supp. 1164, 1176 (D.N.J. 1993) (good faith allegations of ongoing violation as to 
one parameter establish jurisdiction over past and present violations); Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 503 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(modified parameter-by-parameter approach in which ongoing violation of one parameter 
establishes jurisdiction for violations of ail parameters caused by the same technical 
problem). 
" See Memorandum from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Nov. 
9, 1987), Marshall Papers. supm note 47. Stevens wrote, "It is clear that a citizen may 
recover civil penalties for violations of the Act that occur after the complaint is filed, but 
I am not at all sure that such a recovery for 'past violations'-i.e., those that occurred 
before the suit was filed-are authorized by 9 505." Id. 
96 Id. 
Heinonline - -  23 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 573 1998-1999 
fail. I am not sure it's a matter of critical importance 
whether it fails for want of jurisdiction or simply fails for 
want of proof.97 
It was this latter point, whether a good faith allegation suffices for 
jurisdiction under section 505, which was the focus of Scalia's first draft 
of a conc~rrence.~~ Scalia wrote to Marshall that he thought "it more 
orthodox to achieve substantially the same result through interpretation of 
the term 'in violation."'" Scalia's draft provides the only real discussion 
of the factual overlap of jurisdiction and merits, and it is limited. There he 
noted that some of the same facts would be involved in a challenge to the 
jurisdictional allegation as well as on the merits, but called it "entirely 
standard."Im "It is so commonplace for jurisdictional issues to overlap 
with the merits that the Court's interpretation here can hardly be justified 
on some principle that overlap is to be avoided wherever fea~ible."~~' 
Scalia eliminated this language from the final version of the concurrence. 
Scalia also wrote Marshall that language in Marshall's draft 
opinion suggested that the plaintiff did not have to offer proof of his 
allegations of standing if challenged by a motion for summary judgment.I0' 
That would conflict have conflicted with the Court's recent opinion in 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,Io3 in which the justices had ruled that summary 
judgment must be granted against a plaintiff who does not make a showing 
sufficient to establish the essential elements of his case.I0" In Scalia7s 
view, Celotex, as applied to a factual issue with respect to standing, would 
97 Id. 
98 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., No. 86-473, First 
Draft of Concurring Opinion by Justice Scalia (Nov. 9, 1987), slip op. at 2, Marshall 
Papers, supra note 47. 
99 Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Nov. 9. 
1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47. 
loo Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., No. 86-473, First Draft 
of Concurring Opinion by Justice Scalia (Nov. 9, 1987), slip op. at 2, Marshall Papers, 
supra note 47. As an example, he stated that allegations of injury in fact made to support 
standing could be challenged by a motion for summary judgment, and if genuine issues 
of material fact remained, they might be litigated at trial, even in a situation where proof 
of injury was part of plaintiffs case on the merits. See id. 
lo' Id., slip op. at 3 ,  Marshall Papers, supra note 47. 
lo' See Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice Thurgood Marshall, (Nov. 
10, 1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47. 
lo' 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). 
l0-ee id. at 2552. 
Heinonline - -  23 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 574 1998-1999 
require the plaintiff to respond to a motion for summary judgment with 
sufficient evidence so that the court might rule in his favor.'0s That burden 
of production having been met, the motion should be denied and the issue 
set for trial. I W  
In response to Stevens and Scalia, Marshall agreed that this case 
was not the vehicle to decide "the difficult question of when civil penalties 
are appropriate in conjunction with an action for abatement," and changed 
the language that was of concern to Stevens and S~alia. '~'  As for Celotex, 
Marshall assured Scalia that there was nothing inconsistent in the 
Gwaltney opinion.Io8 The party moving for summary judgment bears the 
burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact, he 
said, and Gwaltney "in no way suggests that the nonmoving party may 
prevail upon a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element 
of that party's case."'0g But Marshall remained firm that the Court should 
address the good-faith allegation question, noting that the parties and 
amici all devoted substantial time to it below, and "[oln remand, it will 
certainly resurface, and our failure to address it here will only create 
confusion and spec~lation."~~~ 
'05 See Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice Thurgood Marshall, (Nov. 
10, 1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47. 
'06 See id. 
'07 Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Conference, (Nov. 10, 1987), 
Marshall Papers, supra note 47. The exchange among the justices gives no indication of 
the latter linkage that some courts would make between penalties and injunctive relief. 
See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Serv. (TOC), Inc., 149 
F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998) cert. granted 119 S.Ct. 11 11 (1999). See also discussion infra 
note 183. 
'08 See Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Conference, (Nov. 10, 
1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47. 
I w  Id. Marshall later made a slight change in the opinion to make this point clear. 
Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Antonin Scalia, (Nov. 12. 1987), 
Marshall Papers. supra note 47. 
' I0  Id. The District Court had rendered an alternative holding based on respondents' good 
faith allegation. See Gwaltney 1, 61 1 F .  Supp. 1542, 1549 n.8 (E.D. Va. 1985). The 
Court of Appeals noted that a "sound argument" could be made in support of such a 
holding, although it did not rule on the question. See G\valr~ze~v 11, 791 F.2d 304, 308 n.9 
(4th Cir. 1986). 
Justice O'Connor shared Stevens' and Scalia's concerns about the jurisdictional 
issue and about the problem of recovery for past violations joined with an ongoing 
violation, and said she would wait to see what changes were made in the draft. See 
Memorandum from Justice Sandra Day O'Comor to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Nov. 9, 
1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47. She eventually joined in the judgment and in 
Scalia's concurrence. 
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The internal colloquy among Marshall, Stevens and Scalia 
delineates fairly clearly the views of the justices, which is not necessarily 
true of the language of the draft or the final majority and concurring 
opinions. Marshall wrote to his colleagues that he saw Justice Stevens' 
point that the ultimate outcome of this case "will not be affected whether 
we require a good faith allegation of an ongoing violation or proof of that 
allegation to support jurisdiction, because the allegation must ultimately 
be proved or the case will fail on the merits.""' 
Marshall nevertheless was unmoved by Steven's request to avoid 
addressing the issue, asserting that he continued 
to believe (along with the Solicitor General) that Congress 
used the word "alleged" in 9 505 with a purpose. That 
word does not frequently appear in grants of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Congress more often requires that certain 
events exist-for example, that citizens be residents of 
different states or that the amount in controversy exceed 
$1 o,ooo.112 
Justice Marshall remained "convinced that this difference makes a 
difference." !I3 
As for the points raised by Justice Scalia, Justice Marshall argued 
that the express language of section 505 reflected "a perfectly logical and 
reasonable congressional intent . . . to permit the federal courts to assert 
jurisdiction over such suits on the basis of good faith allegations and to 
defer challenges to the underlying facts until summary judgment or 
trial."Il4 Congress, he reasoned, recognized that proof of an ongoing 
violation might be difficult, requiring substantial discovery, and that it 
would overlap completely with proof on the merits at t r ial .I iVet in the 
opinion for the Court, Marshall only obliquely refers to these 
considerations, noting a congressional "sensitivity to the practical 
difficulties of detecting and proving chronic episodic violations of 
environmental  standard^.""^ 
"I Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Conference, (Nov. 10, 1987), 
Marshall Papers, supl-n note 47. 
' I 2  Id. 
' I J  Id. 
Id. 
" See id. 
'Ib Gnlaltne~: 484 U.S. 49, 65 (1987) (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 
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Continuing to outline the litigation process under his construction 
of the statute, Marshall wrote to his colleagues, "I quite agree with Nino 
that the truth of a plaintiffs allegations may be challenged, either in a 
summary judgment motion or on the merits at trial.""' He further agreed 
that plaintiffs case would fail at summary judgment without a genuine 
issue of material fact as to the truth of the allegations, and, as Justice 
Stevens had noted, there would be "no way for a plaintiff to prevail on the 
merits without ultimately proving the truth of his allegations.""* Again, 
this recognition of the need to prove at some point the allegations of 
ongoing violation did not appear clearly in the opinion.Ilg 
Marshall professed himself puzzled by the tone of Scalia's draft 
concurrence, complaining that their disagreement was a "semantic 
squabble,"-"What I would term dismissal for lack of standing or failure 
of proof on the merits, Nino would call a defect in subject matter 
jurisdiction,"-and had no practical  consequence^.'^^ He did not believe 
that any Clean Water Act cases would come out differently because of his 
construction, and affirmed that his opinion only interpreted the 
jurisdictional grant contained in unusual language of section 505 of the 
Clean Water Act, and that it was not a pronouncement of any generally 
applicable principles of juri~diction.'~' 
Scalia responded to Marshall, pursuing the good faith allegation 
issue.'22 He agreed that it was unlikely that Marshall's formulation would 
make any difference in Clean Water Act cases.I2) But that only made him 
"all the more reluctant to acknowledge that Congress has so subtly created 
such an unusual jurisdictional provision-which will become known as 
'Gwaltney-type jurisdiction,' and may be discovered in other statutes 
18). The Solicitor General was of the same view, arguing that "[tlhe statutory scheme 
wisely postpones the question whether the defendant is in fact failing to comply with his 
permit requirements for adjudication on the merits." Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 19. 
' I 7  Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Conference, (Nov. 10, 1987), 
Marshall Papers, nipra note 47. 
Id. 
' Iq  The only reference to such a scheme was not related to the jurisdictional issue itself, 
but appeared in Marshall's discussion of standing. See G~ilaltney, 484 U.S. at 65-66. 
"O Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Conference, (Nov. 10, 1987), 
Marshall Papers, sicpl-a note 47. 
'I See id. 
"' See Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice Thurgood Marshall, (Nov. 
10, 1987), Marshall Papers. siipra note 47. 
See id. 
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where it will make a differen~e."'~~ He argued that for the benefit of both 
- 
the Court and Congress it seemed "an important part of sound judicial 
practice not to discern such an irregular disposition where it has not been 
clearly created."125 
Marshall remained unpersuaded, viewing as unfounded Scalia's 
concern that this jurisdictional ruling would impact upon other statutes.Iz6 
He replied, "Our reading of 505 is expressly based upon Congress' use 
of the word 'alleged' in the jurisdictional grant and the peculiar fact that 
the proof of a plaintiffs allegations would overlap completely with the 
merits of the case.""' In his view, the "alleged to be in violation" 
language was unlikely to appear often in statutory grants of authority, "and 
on the rare occasions that it does occur, 'Gwaltney-type jurisdiction' is 
probably warranted."128 
Their differences remained unresolved, and with only the small 
changes agreed to by Justice Marshall, his original drafi became the 
opinion of the Court.IZ9 
VI. SPREADING CONFUSION 
It is unfortunate that the final versions of both Justice Marshall's 
majority opinion and Justice Scalia's concurrence left considerable 
uncertainty as to the standard being applied and the timing of proof. The 
quizzical titles of articles written at the time are ample illustration of the 
confusion that ~revai1ed.I~~ On remand, the Fourth Circuit reflected that 
124 Id. 
IZS Id. 
E6 See Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justice Antonin Scalia, (Nov. 
12, 1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47. 
Id. 
Id. 
"%arshall obtained the votes of Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices Brennan. 
White and Blackmun for his interpretation of 5 505 jurisdiction, while Justices Stevens 
and O'Connor joined Scalia's concurrence. 
I3O See Emily O'Connor, Comment, Gwalmey of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation-The End of tlie Inquiry or the Beginning of Confirsion?, 50 U .  PIT. L. REV. 
1209 (1989); Joel A. Waite, Tlie Coritinlting Questions Regarcling Citizen Suits Under tlie 
CIenn Water Act: Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 46 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 313 (1989); Nauen. supra note 32. Mr. Nauen observed that both 
industry and environmentalists proclaimed victory in the case, and suggested that either 
side could be right. depending upon the manner in which lower courts interpreted the 
decision. See id. at 349. 
There were numerous commentators who pointed out issues, in addition to the 
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uncertainty when the court reviewed and upheld the district court's finding 
that CBF and NRDC had made a good faith allegation of ongoing 
violations.131 The appellate judges believed though that they were also 
required by the Supreme Court's majority opinion to determine whether 
plaintiffs had actually "proved their allegation of continuous or 
intermittent violation, as required in order to prevail."I3' They took issue 
with Justice Scalia's suggestion that the plaintiffs might never be called on 
to prove the jurisdictional allegation, concluding that the "majority does 
expressly require that a citizen-plaintiff prove the existence of an ongoing 
violation (continuous or intermittent) in order to prevail."'33 The appellate 
court believed that the difference between the majority and the concurring 
justices was not whether an ongoing violation had to be proved, but when, 
"with the concurrence requiring proof of an ongoing violation as a 
threshold jurisdictional matter."134 Other courts have reached differing 
question of when an ongoing violation must be proved, that were created or left 
unresolved by Gwaltney: What constitutes good faith? How is an ongoing violation 
defined? What is continuing or intermittent? Will it be analyzed in terms of aggregate 
violations, or on a pollutant by pollutant basis? How is the mootness doctrine to be 
applied? May penalties be assessed for precomplaint violations, or when abatement is 
not appropriate? And what is the impact of cessation of violations under Article III? 
See, e.g., Miller, Invitation, supra note 22, at 10,103-04; O'Connor, supra, at 1225-27; 
Shea, supra note 63, at 871-878; L. Ward Wagstaff, Citizen Suits and the Clean Water 
Act: The Supreme Court Decision in Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 89 1,920-24; Waite, supra note 130. 
13' See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 844 F.2d 170 
(1988). 
13' Id. at 171. 
I j 3  Id. at 171 n.1. 
I J 4  Id. The Fourth Circuit went further and outlined two alternatives by which the trial 
court might determine whether an ongoing violation had been proved. Plaintiffs might 
actually prove violations that continued on or after the date the complaint was filed, or 
they might adduce evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that 
there existed a "continuing likelihood of a recurrence in intermittent or sporadic 
violations." Id. at 172. It has been suggested that the second alternative stretches the 
definition of continuing violation found in the majority opinion. See O'Connor, supra 
note 130, at 1227 (1989). 
On remand to the district court, Judge Mehrige appeared to combine the 
alternatives, finding that plaintiffs proved an ongoing violation since evidence adduced at 
trial demonstrated a continuing likelihood that violations would recur, and reinstated the 
full $1.3 million penalty. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 
Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1078, 1080 (E.D. Va. 1988). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the finding 
of an ongoing violation, but ruled that penalties could not be imposed for certain 
violations that had been wholly cured, and reduced the penalty to reflect that ruling. See 
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 890 F.2d 690 (1989). 
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conclusions when faced with the is~ue, ' '~ and it has not again been directly 
addressed by the Supreme Court. In reviewing the course of citizen suit 
litigation since Gwaltney, one author recently noted that the decision 
engendered widespread chaos among the courts, and ten years after the 
decision federal courts still struggle to ascertain the scope and 
applicability of the standard it e~tab1ished.l~~ The cost of such conhsion in 
terms of both judicial resources and litigants time and expenditures is 
See, e.g., Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1061 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that subject matter jurisdiction and standing are threshold matters and may be 
established by good faith allegation); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Texaco 
Refining & Mktg., Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 501 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that proof of ongoing 
violation required at trial to establish standing). For a recent example of both the 
continuing conhsion concerning the ongoing violation issue, as well as a graphic 
example of the litigation problems with which a plaintiff must cope, see Atlantic States 
Legal Found., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 1997). 
See Randall S. Abate, Rethinking Citizen Suits for Past Violations of Federal 
Environmental Laws: Recommendations for the Next Decade of Applying the Gwaltney 
Standard, 16 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 9-12 (1997). See also WILLIAM H. 
RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 277-78, 289-90 (2d ed. 1994). It has led to 
"procedural gamesmanship" on the part of defense counsel, who often file a motion to 
dismiss in order to force citizen litigants to put on their case on the merits without 
adequate time for preparation. See Robert Wiygul, Gwaltney Eight Years Later: 
Proving Jurisdiction and Article 111 Standing in Clean Water Act Citizen Suits, 8 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 435,442 (1995). 
Some authors suggest that the decision has not substantially deterred citizens 
from bringing meritorious suits. See, e.g., Wiygul, supra, at 454-55. There is some 
support for this view, since a recent study found that citizen suits now account for almost 
five times as many environmental prosecutions as do federal government suits. See David 
R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal Systetn: Cat1 
Three Not Be a Crotvd When Enforcetnent Authority Is Shared by the United States, the 
States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1609, 1573 (1995). That raises the 
question, however, whether government enforcement programs are sufficiently 
addressing the problems of noncompliance. 
The lower courts have to some extent mitigated the damaging impact of 
Gwaltney through broad interpretations of the continuing violations doctrine. See Albert 
C. Lin, Application of tile Continuitzg Violations Doctriile to Environmental Law, 23 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 723, 764-68 (1996). Nevertheless, one attorney who frequently 
represents environmental citizen litigants estimates that Gtvaltney bars 75-80% of suits 
that could be meritorious. See Letter from James M. Hecker, Trial Lawyers for Public 
Justice, to Ann Powers (Oct. 28, 1998) (on file with author). Moreover, recent Supreme 
Court case law, and lower court decisions following it, threaten to make all civil penalty 
claims moot in all citizen suits. See id. See also. Jim Hecker, EPCRA Citizen Suits Afrer 
Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 28 Envtl. L. Rep (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,306, 
10,308-10 (1998); discussion itfia notes 182-83 and accompanying text. 
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s~bstantial.'~' 
What might the Court have done to alleviate the confusion? It 
might have begun by emphasizing the unusual situation that pertained, 
since the facts that might support jurisdiction, standing and the merits 
were intertwined. But in order to determine how the Court might further 
have explained its decision, we need to first examine the procedural 
framework applicable to the case. That begins with the enabling statute. 
VII. THE PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK 
Typically, a statute creates a cause of action, and vests subject 
matter jurisdiction in the court to hear claims based on that cause of 
action.'38 Standing is an element of a court's jurisdiction, and the litigant 
must meet any standing requirements spelled out in the statute or imposed 
by the Con~titution.'~~ In the case of the Clean Water Act, section 505 
creates the cause of action and provides the grant of jurisdi~tion.'~~ 
Once a suit is filed, the defendant may move to dismiss a 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, including standing, under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l).14' In reviewing a motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the court may go beyond the pleadings to 
determine whether there is a reasonable basis for the jurisdictional claim, 
but that inquiry is limited.'" If the defendant believes that the pleading 
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, then the motion lies 
under Rule12(b)(6)'" and may be converted to a motion for summary 
Professor Rodgers estimated that it easily adds $1 million a year to the cost of citizen 
suit litigation. RODGERS, suprcl note 136, at 290 & n.32. Some of the chaos and expense 
might well have been lessened if the majority opinion in G~valtney had been clearer in its 
explication of the burdens it placed on citizen litigants. 
I J g  In some cases hvo different statutes may be implicated, one which confers the right, or 
from which the right is implied, and another which grants the court authority to hear the 
claim. The federal statutes providing federal question and diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction are the latter type. See 28 U.S.C. $$ 133 1, 1332 (1994). 
See KENT SINCLAIR, SINCLAIR ON FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE, 63-65 (3d ed. 1997). 
"O See 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a) (1994). 
'4 A motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l) can be used to attack two types of defects: 1) 
allegations which are insufficient to show jurisdiction: or 2) the court's actual lack of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. See 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE 8r PROCEDURE $ 1356 (1984). 
IJ' See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 8r ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 5 1350 (2d ed. 1990); 2 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE 5 12.30[3] (3d ed. 1997). 
I J 3  In contrast to a motion under rule 12(b)(l). under 12(b)(6) the court makes no inquiry 
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judgment under Rule 56 if matters extraneous to the pleadings are 
submitted and considered.'" But even at the summary judgment stage, the 
court's inquiry as to jurisdiction is a restricted one. According to 
Professor Wright: 
[ilf, as will usually be true, the issue of jurisdictional 
amount is closely tied to the merits of the cause, the court, 
it is said, should be reluctant to insist on evidence with 
respect thereto, lest, under the guise of determining 
jurisdiction, the merits of the controversy between the 
parties be summarily decided without the ordinary incidents 
of trial.14s 
If the motion fails, jurisdiction lies, and the matter is tried on the merits. 
We must bear in mind that in most cases, jurisdictional facts, such 
as amount in controversy, are required to establish jurisdiction but are not 
elements of a plaintiffs case on the merits.146 If the plaintiff proves less 
than the jurisdictional amount, jurisdiction is not affected and recovery is 
had for the amount proved.14' Professor Wright explained why the amount 
in controversy cannot be made dependent upon the amount the plaintiff 
ultimately recovers: 
To do so would make jurisdiction turn on a guess by the 
trial court as to the final outcome, or would require a 
preliminary trial on jurisdiction that would duplicate the 
regular trial on the merits, or would demand a wastehl 
jurisdictional dismissal, after the case has been fully heard 
on the merits, because the final award was less than the 
past the pleadings, and must assume for purposes of the motion that all of the allegations 
in the complaint are true. See 2 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., IMOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
9 12.34[1][b]. [2] (3d ed. 1997). 
'"" FED R CIV P. 12(b)(6). 
I"' CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 183 (1983). 
I J b  See id. at 1 82-83. 
I"' The First Circuit in Pnliar.~er Cove analyzed CWA 8 505 in this fashion, giving the 
"alleged to be in violation" language "the [full] practical construction that is given to the 
510,000 requirement for jurisdiction in a diversity case. There jurisdiction is not 
necessarily lost if, in the final analysis, a lesser sum is involved, a reasonably held 
allegation is sufficient." Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc., v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 
1089, 1093 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.. 303 
U.S. 283,288-89 (1938)). 
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jurisdictional amount.'48 
Some of the confusion in the Gwaltney opinion may be due to the 
fact that Justice Marshall did not carefully apply these rules to the 
particular facts in Gwaltney. As Justice Scalia pointed out, the 
jurisdictional fact under section 505 is a good faith allegation of an 
ongoing vi01ation.I~~ That is akin to an allegation of a jurisdictional 
amount. Thus the issue on a motion to dismiss should be whether 
plaintiffs alleged ongoing  violation^;'^^ on summary judgment it should be 
whether plaintiffs in good faith believed the violations to be ongoing, or 
perhaps whether they could reasonably have had such a belief. An inquiry 
into the existence of good faith would focus primarily on plaintiffs' 
subjective beliefs. However, some examination of defendant's state of 
compliance would probably be needed to establish the facts known to the 
plaintiffs which reasonably could have led them to believe in good faith 
that violations were ongoing. But plaintiffs would not have to show that 
the company was actually in a state of noncompliance, only that they in 
good faith believed that it was. The defendant could attempt to disprove 
plaintiffs' good faith by establishing facts that were, or should have been, 
known to plaintiffs at the time the complaint was filed demonstrating that 
the violations had been fully rectified, and that no reasonable person could 
have had a good faith belief of an ongoing violation. 
In addition to challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction 
over the claim under section 505, the defendant may also challenge 
plaintiffs' standing, again by demonstrating on a motion to dismiss or for 
summary judgment "that the allegations were sham and raised no genuine 
I4'See WRIGHT, supra note 145, at 182. Diversity presents a slightly clearer situation 
since the question of citizenship is not linked to the question of remedy. Thus if a good 
faith allegation of diversity is made, and sustained on a motion to dismiss, then diversity 
exists. It will not be defeated if one of the litigants later assumes residence in the 
opponent's state. See id. at 156-57. 
See Gwvaltney, 484 U.S. 49,67-68 (1987). 
"O The Solicitor General provided a further analysis which the court might usefully have 
employed: 
If the citizen fails to allege a present violation, his complaint is subject 
to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. . . . Furthermore, a citizen's failure to 
allege a present violation also constitutes a jurisdictional defect that 
would justify dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l). 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 20 n.32, 484 U.S. 
49 (1987). 
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issue of fact."Is1 The lack of standing could be because the plaintiffs did 
not meet the standard for organizational standing, or because no injury 
occurred to their members."* 
Having created this "peculiar" form of subject matter jurisdiction 
in which the good faith allegation is the jurisdictional fact, cabined by 
Rule 11 (and eventually the mootness doctrine), which would have 
provided citizen litigants with a reasonably simple pleading hurdle, 
Marshall reintroduced proof problems in his discussion of standing.'" 
There again, the discussion is less enlightening than we might have hoped 
for. The familiar litany is recited, that an allegation of the facts upon 
which standing is based may be challenged by a motion for summary 
judgment, and at trial on the merits "the plaintiff must prove the 
allegations in order to prevail."'" But the Court does not make it clear 
what allegations it is referencing. Since the discussion concerns standing, 
does it mean the allegation that there is an ongoing violation? If so, then 
Marshall would require plaintiffs to prove a fact to sustain standing that is 
not required to sustain jurisdiction. That being the case, plaintiffs would 
be put to their proof on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment to 
sustain standing, even if a good faith allegation was sufficient for 
jurisdiction. The matter is no clearer today than it was eleven years ago, 
as reflected by the Supreme Court's most recent citizen suit ruling. 
VIII. G WALTNEY REDUX: STEEL COMPANY v. CITIZENS FOR A BETTER 
ENVIRONMENT 
The question of subject matter jurisdiction again came to the fore 
in Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Eizvirorzmeizt, Is5 which dealt with 
the citizen suit provision of the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA).156 Justice Scalia believed that plaintiffs 
I" Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 66 (quoting U.S. v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669,689 (1973)). 
Is' The bench memorandum regarding G\c~alttrey in Justice Marshall's files focused on 
interpreting the jurisdictional scope of 5 505, but did not deal with procedural issues, 
perhaps because the memorandum suggested affirmance, concluding that "[tlhe structure, 
legislative history, and general purpose of the Clean Water Act support rspts' 
interpretation of $ 505 permitting citizen suits for purely past violations of the Act." 
Bench Memorandum, Oct. 5, 1987 (Aug. 27, 1987), Marshall Papers, supra note 47, box 
427, folder 8. 
I"' See G~valtrrey. 484 U.S. at 65. 
Is' Id. at 66. 
Is' 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998). 
I" 42 U.S.C. 3 11046 (1994). 
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standing had to be addressed as  a threshold matter, while Justice Stevens 
sought first to determine whether the statute conferred subject matter 
jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim, and thus perhaps avoid the 
constitutional standing issue.'s7 
EPCRA's citizen suit provision, section 11046(a), L'Authority to 
Bring Civil Actions," allows a citizen to sue the government or private 
parties who fail to do certain enumerated acts.H8 A separate section 
contains the grant of jur isdic t i~n.~~~ Even though the statute does not 
contain the "alleged to be in violation" language of the Clean Water Act, 
Justice Stevens argued that the EPCRA provision was essentially similar 
to that provision reviewed in Gwaltney, and therefore it did not grant 
subject matter jurisdiction unless there was an ongoing ~iolation.'~" Since 
this was a jurisdictional issue, on a par with standing but with a statutory 
rather than constitutional foundation, Stevens believed that it should have 
been addressed first, and the constitutional standing issue thereby 
avoided.I6' Justice Stevens contended that the statutory issue could also be 
fiamed as whether the complaint stated a "cause of action," and that under 
the Court's precedent'62 the existence of a cause of action could be 
addressed, even if standing was uncertain.'63 
Stevens went on to rely on Gwaltney to demonstrate that the 
statutory question could be addressed first, regardless of whether it was 
characterized as subject matter "jurisdiction" or "cause of action."'" 
Stating that Gwaltney "powerfully demonstrates this point," Stevens 
argued that while the Court there 
framed the question as one of "jurisdiction,". . . it could 
also be said that the case presented the question whether the 
plaintiffs had a "cause of action." Regardless of the label, 
the Court resolved the statutory question without pausing to 
"'See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 101 1. 
Is8 See 42 U.S.C. $ 1 1046(a). 
'9 The relevant provision is: "The district court shall have jurisdiction in actions brought 
under subsection (a) of this section against an owner or operator of a facility to enforce 
the requirement concerned and to impose any civil penalty provided for violation of that 
requirement." Id. 5 11046(c). The district court may grant only injunctive relief against 
the government. See id. 
I6O See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1022. 
16' See id. at 102 1. 
'"See Bell v. Hood. 327 U.S. 678,681-685 (1946). 
16' See Steel Co., 1 18 S. Ct. at 1024. 
16' Id. at 1025. 
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consider whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue for 
wholly past violations. Of course, the fact that we did not 
discuss standing in Gwaltney does not establish that the 
plaintiffs had standing there. Nonetheless, it supports the 
proposition that-regardless of how the issue is 
characterized-the Court has the power to address the 
virtually identical statutory question in this case as well.'65 
The majority opinion in Steel Contpany in several instances takes on a 
personal tone, with Scalia accusing Stevens of having once understood 
"the fbndarnental distinction between arguing no cause of action and 
arguing no Article 111 redre~sability,"'~~ and Stevens responding that it was 
not his understanding that had changed, but the state of the Court's 
standing doctrine due to the "current fascination with 'redres~ability."~~~ 
While there are legitimate questions as to whether Justice Stevens' 
view of EPCRA7s citizen suit provision is sound, his interpretation of the 
Gwaltney decision seems more compatible with the text of the opinion and 
with the discussion reflected in the internal memoranda than does Scalia's. 
Faced with the fact that the Court in Gwaltney spoke extensively of 
subject matter jurisdiction, Scalia strives to distinguish it by claiming that 
"~]urisdiction . . . is a word of many, too many, rneaning~,"'~~ and finding 
that the language of Clean Water Act section 505 differs from that of 
EPCRA section 11046 sufficiently to make it unlikely that Congress 
intended to make an ongoing violation a jurisdictional prerequisite.Ib9 
Calling Gwaltney a "drive-by" jurisdictional ruling, Scalia goes further in 
suggesting that the majority's opinion on this issue may not be a ruling at 
16' I d  Not only did Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia disagree on how to interpret 
Gwaltney, they seemed to disagree on what was actually in the opinion, with Stevens 
writing that 'standing was not discussed in G~valtnej~, and Scalia asserting that standing 
was found. See id. at 101 1, 1025. In fact, as Stevens explains in a note, standing was 
addressed, but only in relation to the principal holding. See id. at 1025 11.13. Plaintiffs' 
standing was not specifically examined, it was perhaps implicitly decided. 
'66 Id. at 1013. 
Ib7 Id. at 1024 n.9. 
Ib8 Id. at 1010 (quoting U.S. v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). We are 
again reminded of Humpty Dumpty and poor Alice. See s~lpra note 58 and 
accompanying text. 
See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1010. Scalia seems to question whether CWA (5 505 did 
indeed address subject matter jurisdiction, noting that a particular phrase of (5 505 
"strongly suggested (perhaps misleadingly) that the provision was addressing genuine 
subject-matter jurisdiction." Id. 
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all, but mere dictum with no precedential effect.I7O In support of this view, 
Scalia contends that the opinion displayed not "the slightest awareness that 
anything turned upon whether the existence of a cause of action for past 
violations was technically jurisdictional-as indeed nothing of substance 
did."I7' He declaims, "[tlhe short of the matter is that the jurisdictional 
character of the elements of the cause of action in Gwaltney made no 
substantive difference (nor even any procedural difference that the Court 
seemed aware of), had been assumed by the parties, and was assumed 
without discussion by the Court."172 
In his eagerness to distinguish Gwaltney, Scalia ignores the fact 
that from the time defendant filed its motion to dismiss based on Hamker, 
Gwaltney was about subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant pled in that 
manner,I7' the district court ruled on the issue,174 the court of appeals 
denominated the claim as subject matter j~risdiction,'~' and it was briefed 
and argued before the Supreme Court as subject matter juri~diction.~~~ 
I7O See id. at 1011. 
17' Id. at 1010-11. 
17' Id. at l o l l .  He notes that, in any event, the district court had statutory jurisdiction 
because continuing violations were alleged, which seems to go beyond his concurrence 
in Gwaltney. See id. Moreover, Scalia claims that in Gwaltney Article I11 standing was 
found. See id. His remarks in this regard are somewhat puzzling since the majority did 
not address the standing issue and Scalia argued in his concurring opinion that, even 
under Marshall's theory of the case, on remand the lower court should be directed to 
inquire into the existence of plaintiffs' standing. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49, 70-71 
(1987). Scalia perhaps meant that the standing issue was implicitly decided. See supra 
note 169 and accompanying text. 
17' See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss For Lack Of Jurisdiction at 4, Chesapeake Bay 
Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 61 1 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985) (No. 84- 
0366-R) (arguing that when no violation is ongoing § 505 "does not create jurisdiction of 
the subject matter"). 
17' See Gwalt~ley 1, 6 1 1 F. Supp. 1542, 1547-155 1 (E.D. Va. 1985). 
17sSee G~volttzey 11, 791 F.2d 304,308 (4th Cir. 1986). 
17' This is reflected in the brief of the United States in which the Solicitor General 
outlined the matter succinctly: 
Section 505 requires a citizen to allege, as an essential element of his 
private enforcement action, that the defendant is failing to comply on a 
continuous or intermittent basis with his permit requirements. That 
allegation, when made in good faith and well grounded in fact (Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 11). states a cause of action under Section 505 that falls within a 
federal district court's subject matter jurisdiction . . . . As this Court has 
observed, subject matter jurisdiction "is a question of whether a federal 
court has the power. under the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, to hear a case . . . ." Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 
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Arguing that even if Gwaltney was correct that an ongoing 
violation was requisite for subject matter jurisdiction under Clean Water 
Act section 505, Scalia contends that it did not revise the Court's 
"established jurisprudence that the failure of a cause of action does not 
automatically produce a failure of juri~diction."'~~ Nor did it adopt "the 
expansive principle that a statute saying 'the district court shall have 
jurisdiction to remedy violations [in specified ways]' renders the existence 
of a violation necessary for subject-matter jurisdi~tion."'~~ Justice Stevens, 
Scalia wrote, "wishes to resolve, not whether EPCRA authorizes this 
plaintiff to sue (it assuredly does), but whether the scope of the EPCRA 
right of action includes past violation. Such a question, we have held, 
goes to the merits and not to statutory standing."'79 
One might argue that all of this is a contrived interpretation on 
Scalia's part, because if the statutory question is not a jurisdictional one, 
then standing and the "fascinating" doctrine of redressability can be 
reached immediately. Unfortunately for citizen litigants, the redressability 
issue became the key point in Steel Company. After spending an 
inordinate amount of effort rehting Justice Stevens' contention that the 
statutory issue might be addressed before the constitutional one, Scalia 
disposed of the primary issue in short order, ruling that none of the relief 
sought by plaintifflrespondent would likely remedy its injury, and that 
standing was therefore lacking.'80 The principle relief sought, imposition 
on the company of penalties payable to the federal Treasury for failing to 
(1979). A citizen plaintiff must satisfy the conditions set forth in 
Section 505 to state a cause of action falling within the federal court's 
subject matter jurisdiction. To obtain relief, the citizen must also 
demonstrate, of course, that he possesses standing to bring the action 
and that he is entitled to an available remedy. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 15 & n.19, 
Gwalmey of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (No. 
86-473). The Solicitor further argued: 
Section 505's use of the word "alleged" in conjunction with the phrase 
"to be in violation" indicates that for purposes of satisfying the 
statutory threshold, the question whether the citizen plaintiff has an 
actionable claim-and likewise whether the district court may hear that 
action-depends on the allegations contained in the complaint rather 
than the proof eventually adduced at trial. 
Id. at 16 n.23. 
17' SeeSteel Co., 118 S .  Ct. at 1011. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
See id. at 101 8-20. 
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timely file required reports, would have provided no remediation of an 
injury to the plaintiff in the Court's view, but instead served only to 
vindicate an "undifferentiated public interest" in enforcement of the law.i81 
The Court ruled this could not serve as a basis for standing.i82 The impact 
of this ruling is substantial since, by basing the ruling on a constitutional 
interpretation, the Court undercut Congress' ability to provide citizens a 
cause of action to seek penalties for past violations, thereby insulating past 
unlawful conduct unaccompanied by present violations.i83 
In spite of this unfortunate outcome, it is Justice Scalia's analysis 
of EPCRA section 11046 and conclusion that the statute did not address 
Is' Id. at 1018. 
Is' Id. at 10 18-20. 
The pernicious impact of the decision has already been observed. In Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. 
granted, 1 19 S.Ct 1 1 11 (1999), the Fourth Circuit, relying on Steel Company, reasoned 
that redressability must continue to exist at every stage of review. See id. at 306. 
Accordingly, it held that an action to enforce the Clean Water Act became moot on 
appeal for lack of redressability because plaintiffs had not appealed the denial of their 
requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, and thus the only potential relief available 
at that time was the payment of penalties to the Treasury. See id. at 306. The court 
therefore overturned the district court's verdict assessing a penalty of $405,800 against 
the company for numerous violations of its wastewater discharge permit. See id. at 306- 
07. It also noted that attorneys' fees would not be available to plaintiffs because they 
were not substantially prevailing parties as required under the Act. See id. at 307 n.5 
(citing 33 U.S.C.A. $ 1365(d) (West Supp. 1998)). The case has caused considerable 
consternatio among environmentalists, and its outcome could have a substantial impact 
on the future of citizen suits. See William Glaberson, Novel Antipollution Tool is Being 
Upset by Caul-ts, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1999, at Al.  
Two district courts have followed Laidlaw in dismissing citizen suits. In San 
Francisco Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Division, No. C-96-02161-CAL (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 
1998), the judge ruled that citizens can never seek civil penalties in any citizen suit 
because the Supreme Court announced an "absolute rule of law" that penalties do not 
redress a citizen's injuries. Order (Nov. 19, 1998) (on file with author). Subsequently, 
the court in Dlibois t .  Uniterl Stares Dep'r of Agric., 20 F. Supp.2d 263 (D.N.H. 1998), 
held that because the plaintiffs, by winning their claim for injunctive relief, had mooted 
their claim for penalties. See id. at 268. The court reasoned that because it had enjoined 
the defendant form further violations, "[albsent evidence of continuing misconduct. there 
are no imminent violations of the [Clean Water Act] for civil penalties to deter." Id. at 
268. Public interest attorney James Hecker noted that these cases create a framework 
"where you can't get penalties if you either win or lose injunctive relief." See Letter 
from James IM. Hecker, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, to Ann Powers (Oct. 28, 1998) 
(on file with author). This line of decisions could result in the citizen suit provisions 
being reduced to a federal cause of action to abate a continuing nuisance, which by 
statutory structure and legislative history is clearly not what Congress intended. 
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subject matter jurisdiction in the same manner as section 505 of the Clean 
Water Act that seems more accurate than Justice Stevens', and more 
consistent with the jurisprudence. It may be the Gwaltney decision that 
was, after all, an aberration, creating a "peculiar" and "eccentric" form of 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Justice Marshall was convinced that Congress meant what it said 
when it used the "alleged to be in violation" phrase, a view that anyone 
who has participated in the legislative drafting process may find 
q u e ~ t i o n a b l e . ~ ~ 9 u t  he perceived the jurisdictional debate in Gwaltney to 
arise from the specific language of section 505, and thought it unlikely that 
the decision would be relevant to statutes which did not contain the same 
form~lation.~" Consequently, he might well have concurred with Scalia's 
position on this point in Steel Company. Indeed, if Justice Scalia's 
opinion in Steel Company is any indication, Gwaltney's jurisdictional 
ruling may be reduced eventually to a narrow ruling on subject matter 
jurisdiction based on the "peculiar" language of section 505, or even to 
dicta. This might benefit citizen litigants when the jurisdictional sweep of 
other citizen suit statutes is being considered, since arguably only under 
statutes containing "alleged to be in violation" language is an on-going 
violation necessary for jurisdiction. But what one hand giveth the other 
taketh away, since an ongoing violation might have to be proven to prevail 
on the merits, depending on how the statute is construed, and more 
importantly, on what now appears to be required to meet the redressability 
test for standing.'s6 Even if a court, in examining a citizen suit provision, 
found that Congress did not intend to limit citizens to suits in which a 
violation was ongoing, the Article I11 standing doctrine laid out in Steel 
IR' The author has worked on legislative matters in numerous contexts, including as an 
attorney with the Land and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice. 
'''See G~valtney, 484 U.S. 49,64-67 (1987). 
Is6 There appear to be at least six votes, and perhaps seven, for this standard. Scalia was 
joined in his opinion by Rehnquist, Thomas, Kennedy and O'Connor. See Steel Co., 1 18 
S. Ct. at 1008. Justice Breyer concurred in the part dealing with redressability. See id. at 
1020-21. Justice Souter's position is not clear, since he joined Justice Stevens' 
concurrence. except for the part dealing with redressability. See id. at 1021. Justice 
Ginsburg did not join on that issue either, writing that she would follow Gltlultney, and 
"resist expounding or offering advice on the constitutionality of what Congress might 
have done, but did not do." Id. at 1032. 
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Company would impose the same requirement, and arguably do so in a 
fashion difficult for Congress to alter because of its constitutional 
grounding. 
In the final analysis, Gwaltney has raised substantial impediments 
to citizen litigation, preventing some suits from being initiated or 
maintained, and making all litigation more difficult and costly. Some of 
the difficulties might have been ameliorated had the Court more carefully 
crafted its opinion to spell out, as it did in some of its internal documents, 
the standards imposed upon a citizen litigant in bringing and proving his 
case. It raised issues that have not been adequately addressed by later 
decisions and will continue to present difficulties for citizen litigators. 
Beyond that, the decision imposed serious limitations on citizen suits 
which do not constrain govemment prosecutions such as United States v. 
Smithfield, and were not intended by Congress. As a consequence, it will 
be critically important that the govemment's enforcement presence, as 
reflected in the Department of Justice's recent prosecution of Smithfield 
Foods, is strong and effective. Even so, the minimization of citizens' 
ability to litigate important environmental cases is extremely unfortunate. 
Citizen suits have been a crucial tool in curbing pollution and achieving 
the present level of environmental compliance. Courts should exercise 
care in limiting a mechanism with such a lengthy legal history, which 
Congress deemed essential in protecting the environment and which has 
proved so successful. 
It has been suggested that a citizen suit provision which provided even a nominal sum 
to be paid directly to a prevailing plaintiff would remedy the redressability problem. See 
Harold Feld, Swing the Cirizen Suit: The Effect of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and the 
Role of Citizen Suirs in Eltvironntenml Enforcement, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 141, 178- 
79 (1994). Justice Scalia's discussion of penalties in Steel Conzpany appears to lend 
support to this suggestion. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1018 (penalties under EPCRA 
"might be viewed as a sort of compensation or redress to respondent if they were payable 
to respondent"). 
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